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Abstract
This article discusses the important and influential views of John Burgess on the
nature of mathematical rigour and John Norton on the nature of thought
experiments. Their accounts turn out to be surprisingly similar in spite of different
subject matters. Among other things both require a reconstruction of the initial
proof or thought experiment in order to officially evaluate them, even though we
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almost never do this in practice. The views of each are plausible and seem to solve
interesting problems. However, both have problems and would seem not able to do
justice to some interesting examples. They fail in similar ways. More pluralistic
accounts of proof and of thought experiment could embrace aspects of each, while
rejecting their claimed universality. An ideal account (not provided here) would
contribute to explanation and understanding. These are important topics for future
work.
1 Introduction
Many academic disciplines could be called spectator sports. We can read about
them, watch them, enjoy them. Sports events are, of course, spectator sports, but
so are musical concerts and theatre performances. One does not have to work
through them, as it were, to enjoy them. We simply listen to a piece of music or
watch a football game and are consequently excited and entertained. Intellectual
life is often similar. We can be told about the expanding universe or how we
evolved from earlier life forms. As exciting as it is, this sort of learning is still a
passive activity.
Mathematics and thought experiments (TEs) are not spectator sports. To take in a
piece of mathematics one has to work through it. It is an active, not a passive
process. TEs are similar in this regard. One cannot simply read a TE to take it in.
One has to actually work through it to understand the claim and how the reasoning
goes. Like mathematics this is an active exercise, not a passive one. Active
evaluation is an intrinsic part of it, the way it is not an intrinsic part of watching a
tennis match or listening to jazz. We can read about an actual experiment in a
scientific journal and we take what the experimenter is telling us as a report of the
observational facts.1 Proofs and TEs are quite different from this. We don’t simply
1Of course, this is oversimplified. Experiments often include some interpretive theorizing, with
which we might quibble. But raw data is usually presented as a fait accompli and passively accepted
as such by the reader. The distinction between the active and the passive might be fuzzy, but there
is a distinction none the less.
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read the conclusion; we actually have to work through the proof or the TE. We are
given the evidence and we must check for ourselves. It should come then as no
surprise that mathematics and TEs might have something important in
common.
John Burgess and John Norton have proposed strikingly similar views within their
respective fields of interest. Burgess has given an account of how mathematical
rigour is achieved and Norton an account of how thought experiments work. Their
virtues are similar and significant, and they rightly impress us by taking some of the
mystery out of reasoning in mathematics and in thought experiments, respectively.
They also run into similar problems, which I will try to make clear.
2 Burgess on Mathematical Rigour
Burgess has recently produced a thorough and insightful study of the troublesome
notion of rigour, Rigor and Structure (2015). Many would concur when he says,
“Rigor requires that new mathematical material be logically derived from old, and
ultimately from first principles.” (2015, 51) Actual published proofs are seldom
explicit derivations, so how can we reconcile the ideal with the actual? After
surveying a long history of candidates, Burgess adopts and clarifies the definition of
Hyman Bass: “A proof is what convinces the mathematician that a formal proof
exists.” Burgess takes “a formal proof here to mean something like a deduction in
which every inferential step is a fairly simple one recognized as valid by essentially
all logic texts...” (2015, 96) Crucially, he adds “To be a genuine proof, a supporting
argument must not only produce conviction that a formal proof exists, but it must
do so in the right way... [Moreover] ‘the right way’ to produce conviction that a
formal proof exists is primarily by supplying enough steps of the purported formal
proof.” (2015, 97)
In sum, Burgess’s account of rigour includes four key features. (1) A rigorous
(informal) proof is one that convinces mathematicians that a formal proof exists.
(2) A formal proof is a derivation from first principles or from earlier established
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theorems. (3) A rigorous (informal) proof has a structure that indicates the
structure of the formal proof by containing key steps, at least in outline. (4)
Evidence for a theorem ultimately rests on the existence of a correct formal
proof.
Others have offered versions of proof in the same neighbourhood. Saunders Mac
Lane, a prominent mathematician and one of the fathers of category theory,
expresses the standard view as follows:
A mathematical proof is rigorous when it is (or could be) written out in
the first order predicate language L(ε) as a sequence of inferences from
the axioms ZFC, each inference made according to one of the stated
rules.... To be sure, practically no one actually bothers to write out
such formal proofs. In practice, a proof is a sketch, in sufficient detail to
make possible a routine translation of the sketch into a formal proof....
What is at hand is not the practice of absolute rigor, but a standard of
absolute rigor. (Mac Lane 1986, 377)
There is a huge range of alternative views about proofs, which I will not pursue. A
small slection of views include: Azzouni (2013a, 2013b), Lakatos (1976), Horgan
(1993), Rav (1999), Avigad (2020), Detlefsen (2008)2
2I will, however, mention a couple of things in this footnote. Michael Detlefsen is skeptical of the
common view, but puts it forward this way: “(i) proper proofs are proofs that either are or can be
readily be made rigorous; (ii) proofs that are or can be readily be made rigorous are formalizable;
therefore (iii) all proper proofs are formalizable.” (Detlefsen 2008, 17) Jeremy Avigad is skeptical of
the standard view, which he describes as follows: “Modern logic offers idealized accounts of what it
means to be correct, based on the notion of a formal derivation. On that account, the mathematical
objects we talk about are defined in a suitable formal foundation, our theorems are expressed as
formal statements in that system, and our proofs are required to conform to the axioms and rules....
Of course, ordinary mathematical texts are not nearly as regimented as formal proofs. But, on the
logical story, they can be seen as an approximation to the ideal.” (Avigad 2020, 1) He adds two
objections: “One is that a formal system cannot possibly be the operant standard because most
mathematicians cannot even state the axioms of a particular formal system. The other is that there
are various formal foundations on offer, and who is to say which is the right one?” (ibid., 1)
These are important remarks, causing us to clarify the Burgess position on his behalf. When
Burgess says a rigorous informal proof convinces a mathematician of the existence of a formal
system, we need not say she knows precisely which formal system or what the particular details of
the formalization are. On a more liberal view all we need say is that there is some robust sense
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The idea in general and Burgess’s version in particular is a very clear and plausible
characterization of mathematical rigour. It will appeal to many, perhaps to most
mathematicians. A few things can be noted. Burgess’s expression “produces
conviction” probably means produces a sense of certainty. Some, still in the spirit
of Burgess, might want to modify his characterization in favour of a fallibilist
version. And “convinces the mathematician” could reasonably be understood as
meaning convinces the kind of mathematician with the right training. We need not
worry about the reaction of nonspecialists. Even among specialists, there are those
who are convinced by a faulty proof and those who resist a good one. Burgess
addresses these possibilities, but I will ignore them here.
I should also note that Burgess has interesting things to say about ideal elements,3
elementary vs non-elementary proofs,4 and other matters. These play a part in any
complete account of rigour, but will be ignored here as not relevant to my chief
interest, which is the four features of Burgess’s account that listed that I listed
above.
3 Proofs and Formal Proofs
Burgess’s account fits a great deal of mathematical experience. I will illustrate with
a non-trivial example taken almost at random from a standard text, Rudin,
Principles of Mathematical Analysis (1976). Rudin follows the common
definition-theorem-proof pattern; he begins with a definition of the Γ function,
of a formal proof that the working mathematician has in mind and that is sufficient for Burgess’s
purposes.
3Imaginary numbers and points at infinity are sometimes called “ideal elements.” They simplify
proofs but are considered by some to be only useful fictions. Hilbert took such a view.
4An elementary proof, say of a theorem in Peano arithmetic, is a derivation from the Peano
axioms using only the concepts of that theory. It does not matter how long or complicated the
proof is as long as it sticks to the elements of Peano arithmetic. A proof of the same theorem using,
say, group theory or complex analysis is non-elementary, even if it is only an easy few lines long.
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followed by a three-part theorem about the function, and then a proof of the
theorem. I will comment briefly on the proof after reproducing the whole passage
from Rudin (1976, 192).





(a) The functional equation Γ(x+ 1) = xΓ(x) holds, if 0 < x <∞.
(b) Γ(n+ 1) = n!, for n = 1, 2, 3, ...
(c) log Γ is convex on (0,∞)
Proof: An integration by parts proves (a). Since Γ(1) = 1, (a) implies
(b) by induction. If 1 < p <∞ and (1/p) + (1/q) = 1, apply Hölder’s
inequality [established earlier in the text] and the definition of Γ and
obtain Γ(x/p+ y/q) ≤ Γ(x)1/pΓ(y)1/q. This is equivalent to (c).
This informal proof illustrates Burgess’s account well. It tells us the main step in
proving (a), assuming we already know how to integrate by parts. We can next
prove (b) assuming we know how to prove things by mathematical induction. (c) is
more tricky, since we might have to remind ourselves of the properties of convex
sets. But in each of these three cases we can (perhaps with some effort) construct a
formal proof, that is, a derivation, using the information given in the informal —
but still rigorous — proof. Consequently, Rudin’s informal proof counts as a
rigorous proof by Burgess’s lights. One need only look through standard textbooks
or research journals to see similar examples in abundance.
Incidentally, the Rudin example also illustrates the worth of informal proofs.
Rather than grinding through a formal proof, we often only need to be told that
something follows, say, by induction. Frequently we can see how it might go right
away, contributing to the often elusive mathematical insight or understanding that
we all crave. Mathematics is always worthwhile, but it is the occasional aha effect
that makes it fun.
Burgess rightly notes features such as this, including the fact that the informal
proof is much more intelligible. He also notes that the informal proof might yield
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greater certainty that the formal proof, paradoxically, because the latter is often so
hard to follow that we might miss outright mistakes.
I will return to Burgess’s account after describing John Norton’s strikingly similar
views on a different topic. But before leaving Burgess for Norton, I should say
something about definitions. Much of what is said about proofs applies to
mathematical definitions, as well. Burgess cites Weierstrass’s definition of
continuity and uniform continuity as an example. (2015, 30f) This was the
beginning of ε-δ methods, which are now universal. Before Weierstrass there was
much confusion about continuity and uniform continuity. This was one of those
cases where a modicum of formalization clarified everything. In natural language
we often use “for all there is” and “there is for all” interchangeably, usually without
confusion, as in: “For everyone there is someone” and “There is someone for
everyone.” We know, in fact, that they do not mean quite the same as is illustrated
with the pair: “For every number there is one greater” and “There is a number
greater than every numbers.” When it comes to continuity vs uniform continuity
the difference between ∀ ∃ and ∃ ∀ makes all the difference but is easy to be
confused about. Formalization sorts it out.5
4 Norton on Thought Experiments
Thought experiments present us with a wonderfully interesting problem: How is it
possible, just by thinking, to learn something new about the world? There is a
5Here is the difference in detail. There are three distinct definitions involving continuity of a real
valued function f defined on the interval [a, b]. f is continuous at a point c in [a, b] if and only if ∀ε >
0 ∃δ > 0∀x ∈ [a, b] (|c− x| < δ → |f(c)− f(x)| < ε). If we wish to say that f is continuous at every
point in [a, b], then we add another quantifier at the beginning of the above. Thus, f is continuous at
every point in [a, b] if and only if ∀c∀ε > 0 ∃δ > 0 ∀x ∈ [a, b] (|c−x| < δ → |f(c)−f(x)| < ε). For the
stronger idea of uniform continuity we rearrange the quantifiers. Thus, f is uniformly continuous
on [a, b] if and only if ∀ε > 0 ∃δ > 0 ∀x ∈ [a, b]∀c ∈ [a, b] (|c−x| < δ → |f(c)−f(x)| < ε). The order
of quantifiers was successively: ∀ ∃∀ for continuity at a point, then ∀ ∀∃ ∀ for continuity at every
point, then ∀ ∃∀ ∀ for uniform continuity. These examples show the enormous value of rigorous
definitions. Without the benefit of explicit quantifier rules and quantifier symbols it would be very
had to keep track of the different types of continuity.
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large spectrum of answers, from a form of rationalism to a staunch empiricism,
with several plausible accounts in between.6 John Norton holds a view of thought
experiments that is exceptionally clear and powerful, and has been highly
influential. Norton’s answer to the question is that we actually do not learn
anything new, although we might draw out things that hadn’t previously been
recognized. He asserts that
Thought experiments are arguments which
(i) posit hypothetical or counterfactual states of affairs and
(ii) invoke particulars irrelevant to the generality of the conclusion.
The account is motivated by a staunch empiricism.
Thought experiments in physics provide or purport to provide us
information about the physical world. Since they are thought
experiments rather than physical experiments, this information does not
come from the reporting of new empirical data. Thus there is only one
non-controversial source from which this information can come: it is
elicited from information we already have by an identifiable argument,
although that argument might not be laid out in detail in the statement
of the thought experiment. The alternative to this view is to suppose
that thought experiments provide some new and even mysterious route
to knowledge of the physical world. (Norton 1991, 129)
Galileo’s wonderful argument in the Discorsi shows that all bodies, regardless of
their weight, fall at the same speed (Galileo 1974, 66f.). It is easy to imagine, so no
need for a diagram. It begins by noting Aristotle’s view that heavier bodies (e.g., a
cannon ball, H) will fall faster than light ones (e.g., a musket ball, L): (H > L).
We are then asked to imagine that the heavy cannon ball is attached to the light
musket ball, making a combined object (H + L). What would happen if it were
6My own view, which is on the rationalist side can be found in Brown (1991/2011, 2004). Norton
holds down the empiricist pole in a number of articles including Norton (1991, 1996, 2004a, 2004b).
Stuart et al (2017) is a useful source of a range of topics and issues.
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released?
Reasoning in the Aristotelian manner leads to an absurd conclusion. First, the
light ball will slow up the heavy one, acting as a kind of drag, so the speed of the
combined system would be slower than the speed of the heavy ball falling alone
(H > H + L). On the other hand, the combined system is heavier than the heavy
ball alone, so it should fall faster (H + L > H). We now have the absurd
consequence that the heavy ball is both faster and slower than the combined
system. Thus, the Aristotelian theory of falling bodies is inconsistent; hence,
destroyed.
But the question remains, Which falls faster? The right answer is now plain as day.
The paradox is resolved by making them equal; they all fall at the same speed
(H = L = H + L).
According to Norton, this thought experiment can be reconstructed as an explicit
argument. Reconstructing is no easy matter and often involves considerable effort.
Norton’s reconstruction of the Galileo thought experiment in the form of an
argument goes as follows:
1. Assumption for reductio proof: the speed of fall of bodies in a given
medium is proportionate to their weights.
2. From 1: if a large stone falls with 8 degrees of speed, a smaller stone
half its weight will fall with 4 degrees of speed.
3. Assumption: if a slower falling stone is connected to a faster falling
stone, the slower will retard the faster and the faster speed the slower.
4. From 3: if the two stones of 2 are connected, their composite will fall
slower than 8 degrees of speed.
5. Assumption: the composite of two weights has greater weight than
the larger.
6. From 1 and 5: the composite will fall faster than 8 degrees.
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7. Conclusions 4 and 6 contradict.
8. Therefore, we must reject assumption 1.
9. Therefore, all stones fall alike. (Norton 1996, 341-2)
I think this is adequate to get the idea behind Norton’s proposal. However, he
acknowledges that more detail might be necessary, but for our purposes, we need
not include it here.7
After the reconstruction, the evaluation of a TE, according to Norton, takes the
following process: Evaluate the premisses: Is there sufficient evidence of their
truth? Typically, this is an empirical task. Second, evaluate the argument’s
7For those wanting the full story, here are the extra details Norton provides.
This final step is actually quite tricky. Its analysis varies according to whether the
thought experimenter makes a tacit assumption:
8a. Assumption: The speed of fall of bodies depends only on their weights.
However, in either case, with or without this assumption, it is hard to see any room
for a Platonic leap in the final step. If assumption Ba is made, then the move from
the refutation of Aristotle’s theory (8) to Galileo’s theory (9) is a simple inference.
The most general viable theory is that the speed of fall of bodies is some arbitrary
monotonic increasing function of their weights. (Any other choice would have to allow
the function to decrease somewhere, which amounts to the possibility of a heavier
body falling slower than a lighter one!) Galileo’s own theory arises as the special case
of a constant function. Now any admitted function other than Galileo’s leads to a
contradiction through a simple argument almost exactly the same as the argument
steps 1-8 and immediately obvious to anyone who has followed Salviati’s inferences.
Consider a faster-falling, heavier body and a slower-falling, lighter body. If we connect
them in their fall, the slower will retard the faster, so that the composite falls at an
intermediate speed. This contradicts the consequence that the heavier composite must
fall no slower than either of its lighter parts. Thus we can give the transition from8
to 9 as:
8a. Assumption: The speed of fall of bodies depends only on their weights.
8b. Assumption: The speed of fall of bodies is some arbitrary monotonic increasing
function of their weights.
8c. From 3, 5. If the function is anywhere strictly increasing, then we can find a
composite body whose speed of fall is intermediate between the speed of fall of its
lighter components.
8d. The consequent of 8c contradicts 8b.
9. From 8d. The function is constant. All stones fall alike. (Norton 1996, 342-3)
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validity: Does the conclusion follow deductively or inductively8 from the premisses?
If the answer to both questions is yes, then the TE is a good one. If it fails on
either, then it is bad.
Norton is taken to be an empiricist, and this is largely correct, but it does need
some qualification. He allows that there are TEs in mathematics and in ethics,
which means that when reconstructed as arguments they will have non-empirical
premisses. Even in some physics TEs verificationism might be a premiss, which, of
course, is a normative principle, not an empirical fact. Norton’s empiricism is
secondary to his account. His claim that a TE can be reconstructed as an argument
is his central point. It is also the feature that makes his view similar to Burgess’s
account, since the latter also stresses the importance of reconstructing a proof as a
formal proof, an argument.
5 Discovery vs (Two-stage) Justification
How do Burgess and Norton compare? The main similarity is this: They rely,
respectively, on a reconstruction of the initial proof or initial thought experiment in
order to evaluate it. The reconstruction need not be manifest, but it must be
thought to exist in principle. For Burgess an informal mathematical proof is
rigorous provided there is a corresponding correct formal proof. For Norton, a
thought experiment is a good one provided there is a corresponding sound
argument. In both cases, the initial reasoning, that is, the intuitively natural line of
thought produced by mathematicians or by scientists (in the form typically
published in textbooks or journals), is of evidential value only in so far as it is
8Deductive logic is well understood, but not so inductive. Norton realizes this but is rightly not
bothered in this context. He can leave that to others to sort out. It does, however, present a special
problem for Norton, since he holds unusual views of about inductive logic. He claims that there
are no general principles of induction and every case must pay attention to its own special features.
He calls this “the material theory of induction.” It’s an interesting and important view. It does,
however, get him in trouble with TEs which seem to require general principles of induction to play
a role in the evaluation of the reconstructed argument. Stuart (2020) brings this problem to light.
Fortunately, this plays no role in our concerns here.
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linked to the reconstruction. It is the reconstruction that bears the ultimate
evidential burden for both Burgess and Norton. To repeat, it seldom matters
whether the reconstruction is made manifest; its acknowledged existence (in Plato’s
heaven?) is what matters. In both cases it must be obvious that the reconstruction
can in principle be done.
The nature of the connection between the informal proof or TE and the
reconstruction is one important place where they slightly differ. Burgess requires
the right sort of connection between them for the informal proof to be rigorous. To
repeat, “...the right way to produce conviction that a formal proof exists is
primarily by supplying enough steps of the purported formal proof.” (2015, 97)
This suggests that an informal proof is an enthymeme, which means that we could
construct the corresponding formal proof by filling in the missing parts. This is a
rather strong requirement and might not be satisfiable in some cases, which I will
explain momentarily. Norton, by contrast, has not specified any required
connection between the initial TE and the reconstructed argument. All he demands
for a good TE is a reconstruction that is a good argument. The connection might
be as disparate as an apple falling on Newton’s head and the theory of universal
gravitation. He does, however, suggest that a typical TE will have an obvious
argument form that can without much difficulty be turned into a specific argument.
If pressed, Norton could easily add something similar to the Burgess requirement of
making key argument steps part of being a good TE.
Given the similarity between the views of Burgess and Norton, we might think they
ought to hold the same view on this point. But which way should they tilt? Given
that published mathematical proofs are overwhelmingly informal, there really
couldn’t be a huge gap between what we read and find persuasive in mathematical
texts and journals and a formal proof, which Burgess considers the ultimate
evidence. An appeal to the usual justification-discovery distinction would no do. It
would be like reading a chemistry book and when the structure of the benzine
molecule is discussed, we are not told that it is a ring, only that Kekulé had a
dream about a snake. Freud might find this interesting, but chemistry students
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would be mistified. The connection between the informal proof or TE and the
formal proof or reconstructed TE needs to be fairly close. The informal proof/TE,
after all, is typically persuasive in its own right. The formal proof or reconstructed
TE cannot consist in utterly different evidence. Burgess has this covered by
insisting that to be rigorous the informal proof must contain the key steps of a
formal proof (if only in a sketchy form).
Burgess acknowledges the traditional discovery-justification distinction but brushes
it aside. “One of the first things to note about rigor is that it pertains only to what
philosophers of science call the ‘context of justification,’ as opposed to the ‘context
of discovery’.” (Burgess 2015, 8) This is important for a couple of reasons. Burgess
is surely right to think of a rigorous proof as evidence, hence as justification. But it
also implies that justification is a two-step process. First comes the informal
rigorous proof, then the formal proof. Together they are the complete justification.
The discovery stage was earlier, based on seeing a falling apple, having a dream
about a snake, calculating lots of examples until a patterns seemed to arise, and so
on. These are not evidence but they might suggest a possible theorem and even
suggest a proof of that theorem.
Norton does something similar. That is, he notes the discovery-justification
distinction but then puts everything important into justification — though he does
not use the terminology in precisely this way. He also turns justification into a two
stage process. I use “context of discovery/context of justification” differently than
Norton does in the following passage, but that is a mere terminological
matter.
Two forms of the thesis. The thesis that thought experiments are
arguments requires some elucidation. Is the claim merely that thought
experiments can do no more than argumentation when it comes to
justifying claims? Or is it, in addition, that the actual execution of a
thought experiment is just the execution of an argument? Following
Norton (1996, p. 354), I intend the stronger version and urge both:
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(1a) (Context of justification) All thought experiments can be
reconstructed as arguments based on tacit or explicit assumptions.
Belief in the outcome-conclusion of the thought experiment is justified
only insofar as the reconstructed argument can justify the conclusion.
(1b) (Context of discovery) The actual conduct of a thought experiment
consists of the execution of an argument, although this may not be
obvious, since the argument may appear only in abbreviated form and
with suppressed premises. (Norton 2004b, 50)
To say, as Norton does, that the unreconstructed TE is a non-obvious argument,
because it is abbreviated or has suppressed premisses, sounds a lot like Burgess’s
rigorous informal proof. At this stage we are already in the realm of justification.
The discovery stage has long passed and now a Galileo or a Newton or an Einstein
is presenting us with evidence for some theory. Norton’s explicit arguments are like
Burgess’s formal proofs.
Norton seems to be saying implicitly what Burgess made explicit. A rigorous proof,
according to Burgess, convinces mathematicians “in the right way” because it
contains key steps in the corresponding formal proof. Norton is not so specific and
allows that the argument character of a TE might not be obvious, but it
nevertheless is an argument and might, for instance, merely need the suppressed
premisses to be made explicit. At a minimum, the TE is suggests a proper
argument.
Discovery plays no role for either Norton or Burgess. Justification is everything.
What is important about their common view is that justification is a two-stage
entity, even if the second stage is normally not carried out. For Burgess a normal
informal proof is rigorous because we are convinced that a formal proof exists.
Only rarely do we bother to construct one. For Norton a TE, as we normally
encounter them, is a good one, because there is a corresponding argument that is
sound. In most cases we are convinced of this, but only rarely make the argument
explicit.
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Questions naturally arises. For Burgess: Are there any proofs that we could
plausibly call rigorous that do not have corresponding formal proofs? For Norton:
Are there any TEs that need not be reconstructed as arguments to be convincing in
their own right? As we shall see, the answer is yes in both cases.
6 Problems with Burgess
There is one more aspect of Burgess’s view that I want to consider before looking
at specific problems. A great deal of mathematical activity does not involve proof,
however we might conceive of proof. It is often called inductive or experimental
mathematics, although those terms do not cover all. It is important for all sorts of
reasons. For one thing, mathematicians need to have some idea of what problems
might be worth tackling or suitable for assigning as a PhD topic. A young career
could be ruined by stupid problems. Perhaps more interesting are kinds of evidence
that differ from proofs. For instance, the evidence cited for speculations and
conjectures made in conference talks or in blogs, which are an increasingly popular
outlet for mathematical ideas in an early stage.9 Such conjectures are often
supported by inductive evidence that would be considered stellar in the sciences,
but fall short of proof, as normally conceived by the mathematical
community.
Recall my summary of Burgess’s account of rigour, which includes four aspects. (1)
a rigorous (informal) proof is one that convinces mathematicians that a formal
proof exists. (2) A formal proof is a derivation from first principles or from earlier
established theorems. (3) A rigorous (informal) proof has a structure that indicates
the structure of a formal proof by containing key steps, at least in outline. (4)
evidence for a theorem ultimately rests on the existence of a formal proof.
My unease with the Burgess account of rigour turns on two aspects of his account.
9Here are two excellent ones by leading mathematicians. Both are rather advanced: Timothy
Gowers’s blog: https://gowers.wordpress.com, Terence Tao’s blog: https://terrytao.wordpress.com.
There are lots more on the Internet at various levels of sophistication.
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(1) and (3) are the problem. (2) and (4) are either okay as they are or could be
slightly modified into acceptable form. (For instance, I would reject (4) if it says
that evidence rests exclusively on the existence of a formal proof.) Before
proceeding, however, I stress that the Burgess account seems quite right for a great
many cases, perhaps even most. I also think it would be accepted by the general
mathematical community. What I am disputing is its claim to universality. The
cases where it fails are important and shed light on the nature of
mathematics.
Contra (1): (A rigorous informal proof is one that convinces mathematicians that a
formal proof exists): First, on the Burgess account it is a mystery why we value
multiple proofs of the same theorem. If the point of a proof is to convince us that a
formal proof exists, then why multiple proofs when the first one did the job of
convincing us? The usual answer to this question is that different proofs give us
different kinds of insight into what is going on. To be fair, Burgess could rightly
reply that he is only interested in what makes a proof rigorous, not what make it
insightful. This is a perfectly acceptable reply, but we should always keep in mind
the importance of explanation and understanding, even though they are very
difficult to characterize.
Second, there are fields of mathematics where the first principles are not complete,
thus, there will be propositions P such that neither P nor not-P is derivable from
those first principles. And yet, we might have an informal proof that P is true.
Two examples come to mind. Gödel famously proved that any system strong
enough to represent arithmetic would have true but unprovable sentences. He
constructed a sentence G that could be understood to say of itself that it is
unprovable, which indeed it was. So, it is plausible to claim (as did Gödel) that G
is true and we have a kind of proof of it, but there is no formal proof.10
10Gödel’s incompleteness theorem can be found in most advanced logic books. An interesting
special case is described in Paris and Harrington (1977). They find an explicit example of a true
but unprovable sentence of Peano Arithmetic.
16
A second example concerns the continuum hypothesis (CH) which is independent
from the axioms of set theory, hence there is no formal proof of it or its negation.
(This independence is from the rest of mathematics, if we think that it all reduces
to set theory). I will briefly give an informal proof due to Freiling (1986) that CH is
false. If the informal proof works, then it would be a case of a rigorous proof
without a corresponding formal proof. I can here give little more than a hint of the
actual argument, which is rather technical.11
The CH is the claim that the continuum of real numbers R has the cardinality ℵ1.
Cantor’s diagonal argument showed that it is larger than the natural numbers N
and the rational numbers Q which are both ℵ0. CH is the claim that the
continuum is the next infinite number. Since the cardinality of R is 2ℵ0 , CH is the
claim that ℵ1 = 2ℵ0 . Thanks to the work of Gödel and Cohen we know that CH
cannot be proved or refuted on the basis of existing set theory. That is, there exists
no formal proof of CH or of not-CH. But, as any mathematical realist would say,
CH is nevertheless true or false; we merely don’t know which. Could there be some
sort of argument for CH or against it?
Chris Freiling (1986) produced a remarkable argument that shows CH is false.
Needless to say, it is somewhat controversial. However, it is sufficiently interesting
to be worth considering and even if the proof fails to work, it can be highly
instructive here. It provides an example of a kind of mathematical reasoning that is
plausible and should be considered legitimate in principle.
We begin by assuming CH is true, aiming for an absurdity, then concluding it must
be false. As background, we assume ZFC (Zermelo-Frankel set theory with the
axiom of choice). This implies what is known as well ordering, which means we can
line up the real number with the so-called ordinals, including the transfinite
ordinals. It will be enough to restrict ourselves to the real numbers in the interval
(0, 1). A well ordering of (0, 1) is not the usual ordering based on size, but
something else. In fact, we have no idea of what a well ordering of the reals would
11For a more detailed exposition, see Freiling (1986), Mumford (1999),
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be, but ZFC implies that one exists. Our assumption that CH is true means that
the size of (0, 1) is ℵ1.
Next we imagine tossing two darts at the interval (0, 1). Obviously, this is a
thought experiment. The darts hit two real numbers p and q. They do this (1) at
random, (2) independently from one another, and (3) symmetrically, in that the
order of tosses is not relevant.
Each ordinal contains its predecessor. Thus, 3 = {0, 1, 2}, and ω is defined as the
set of all finite ordinals, ω = {0, 1, 2, 3, ...}. The ordinal number ω corresponds to
the cardinal number ℵ0, which is the cardinality of a countable infinity. The set of
all countable ordinals is Ω, which corresponds to the cardinal number ℵ1.12 The
ordinals, which are automatically well ordered, are:
0, 1, 2, 3, ..., ω, ω + 1, ..., ω + ω, ..., ωω, ...,Ω, ...
The well ordering theorem and the assumption that CH is true means we can line
up (0, 1) with these ordinals. They will jump around, not maintaining their normal
order, but every number in (0, 1), including the the ones we picked out with the
darts, p, q, would correspond to some ordinal. Perhaps p = π/4 might correspond
with ω + 284 and q = 0.9943 might correspond with 17.
The person who tosses the dart that lands on p can argue as follows: No matter
where p is in the well ordering, there will be a countable number earlier and an
uncountable number later. Appealing to a standard result in measure theory, any
countable set has measure zero. Interpreting probabilities as measures, it follows
that the probability of the other dart being earlier in the well ordering is zero. (It
could happen, since probability zero does not imply impossibility, but there is zero
chance that the event will happen.)
The second dart thrower reasons the same way. No matter which number q I hit
12Different symbols are used. If we were going beyond the first uncountable ordinal, here called
Ω, it would be best to use: ω0, ω1, ω2, ... which correspond to the cardinal numbers ℵ0,ℵ1,ℵ2, ...
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with my dart, there will be a countable number earlier and an uncountable number
later in the well ordering. So, p must be later. The probability of p being earlier is
zero (though still a possibility).
We have reached an absurdity. In any pair of tosses, one must be earlier than the
other in the well ordering, yet by the correct reasoning of each dart tosser the
probability of either being earlier is zero. The assumption that CH is true led to
this, so we conclude that CH is false. Of course, logically speaking, some other
assumption might be to blame. Freiling (in correspondence) tells me that he has
changed his mind and now blames the well ordering principle. That would require a
significant overhaul of existing set theory. I will not pursue this issue here, nor will
I discuss the critics of Freiling’s dart TE, since my only purpose in using this
remarkable example is to illustrate a type of reasoning that is plausibly rigorous
and yet, contra Burgess, cannot be linked to a formal proof.
Contra (3): (A rigorous proof has a structure that indicates the structure of the
formal proof by containing key steps, at least in outline): I doubt that all informal
proofs (rigorous or not) have a structure that is captured by a formal proof, even if
a formal proof exists. Picture proofs, for instance, would typically fail, though not
always. Burgess could say that shows they are bad proofs, but he would be begging
the question against those who claim pictures can be genuine, convincing, even
rigorous evidence. A typical modus ponens vs modus tollens standoff. I will give
examples, so that readers can judge for themselves.
Burgess acknowledges that diagrams would seem to violate the spirit of his
characterization of rigour, but he gives the issue only a footnote.
One thing the proposed formulation does not seem to leave room for is
a role for diagrams, such as one can find in almost any issue of almost
any current journal in the library: Their inclusion may play a part in
convincing readers that a formal proof exists, even though diagrams are
not themselves deductive steps in a formal proofs.... But the issue is a
large one, deserving a monograph of its own, and I will have to set it
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aside. (Burgess, Ch 2, fn25)
He is right; it is a large issue. But it is central to my case, so I will not set it aside.
Rather than rule diagrams out in consequence of not meeting Burgess’s condition,
we might let them in (at least some of them) and claim that they do indeed exhibit
key features of a formal proof. A very nice example from Littlewood might
illustrate. Burgess could accept it as an instance of a rigorous proof that fits his
account.
First, Littlewood defends pictures in general: “A heavy warning used to be given
that pictures are not rigorous; this has never had its bluff called and has
permanently frightened its victims into playing for safety. Some pictures, of course,
are not rigorous, but I should say most are (and I use them whenever possible
myself)” (Littlewood 1953/1986: 54). He then goes on to illustrate with a nice
example.
One of the best pictorial arguments is a proof of the ‘fixed point
theorem’ in one dimension: Let f(x) be continuous and increasing in
0 ≤ x ≤ 1, with values satisfying 0 ≤ f(x) ≤ 1, and let f2(x) = f{f(x)},
fn(x) = f{fn−1(x)}. Then under iteration of f every point is either a
fixed point, or else converges to a fixed point. For the professional the
only proof needed is Figure 1. (Littlewood 1953/1986: 55)
It would be plausible for Burgess to claim that this picture proof is indeed rigorous
(as Littlewood claims), since it arguably would convince a mathematician that a
formal proof exists. The crucial condition in the theorem is illustrated in the
diagram, which could be seen as strongly suggesting what a formal proof would
involve, namely, a convergent series of iterated terms.13
The great value of Littlewood’s example is that it shows two important things.
First, (some) diagrams can be rigorous.14 Second, (some) diagrams can satisfy the
13Burkill (1962, 36f) briefly remarks on the graphical representation of recurrence relations such
as Littlewood’s.
14There is no universal agreement on this. Giaquinto (2007) says “I would not call this a proof,
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Figure 1: Littlewood’s picture proof of the fixed point theorem.
Burgess condition of being convincing because they contain key steps in the formal
proof. Chalk this one up for Burgess. And while we are at it, chalk up another: a
simple diagrammatic proof that the number of real numbers in (0, 1) is the same as
in any other interval (a, b) and even the same as in R. Here are diagrams that seem
to convincingly show this. Figure 2 (left) shows the 1-1 correspondence between
(0, 1) and another finite interval (a, b). What about the infinite interval (−∞,∞),
which is R? Figure 2 (right) makes it clear.
Of course, there are many analytic expressions that will also establish 1-1
equivalence of (0, 1) and R, for instance, tan((π/2)(2x− 1)).
The question that naturally arises next is this: Are there rigorous picture proofs
that clearly do not contain key ingredients of a formal proof? The answer is
yes.
There is a theorem in number theory that is generally well known. The sum of the
numbers up to n is equal to (n2 + n)/2. Or, equivalently,
even for the professional... But it may be possible to substantiate a weaker claim than Littlewood’s:
seeing or visualizing the diagram can initiate a partly visual pass to discovery of the fixed point
theorem.” (2007, 177) He goes on to give a detailed analysis of how this might work (2007, 186-190).
Notice Giaquinto’s implicit appeal to the discovery-justification distinction.
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Figure 2: Equivalent intervals.
Theorem : 1 + 2 + 3 + ...+ n = n2/2 + n/2.
Here is the proof (Figure 3). Try to see how it works. I will explain below.
Figure 3: Picture proof of a number theory theorem.
The little squares represent numbers, so stating from the top and adding, we get:
1 + 2 + 3 + ...+ 7. Next, consider the whole as if it were a 7× 7 square cut in half
by the diagonal. So the number of squares is 72/2. The diagonal cut 7 squares in
half; we want to add them back, 7/2. Thus, the total number of squares is
72/2 + 7/2. This proves the theorem for the special case of the number 7. But
when we understand how this proof works, we are able to grasp all generality and
see that n2/2 + n/2 holds for any number n.
On any reasonable characterization of rigour, this picture proof is, I claim, perfectly
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rigorous. But could it pass the Burgess test for an informal rigorous proof, that is,
does it convince mathematicians of the existence of a formal proof by providing key
steps in the formal proof? There is, of course, a formal proof. It is a proof by
mathematical induction. Does the diagram suggest mathematical induction? No.
The key step in induction is the passage n→ n+ 1, whereas here the diagram
could only suggest the next line, which is the passage 7→ 8. That is not enough.
Grasping the picture proof is not an instance of some dim awareness of a formal
proof by mathematical induction.15
The remarkable thing about some diagrams is that we can somehow grasp all
generality. We literally see the special case of 7, but we intellectually grasp the
proof for all n. This is a remarkable cognitive capacity that we have, a form of
non-sensory intuition. Of course, it is fallible and sometime leads us astray, but
then so do non-diagrammatic proofs.
The upshot of these examples is that the Burgess account of rigour cannot be
completely correct. There are many examples where it does full justice. That is,
there are proofs we can rightly call rigorous because they convince mathematicians
of the existence of a formal proof, and the reason they are convincing is because
they indicate key features of the formal proof. The number theory picture proof is
not like that at all. It is clearly rigorous yet its correctness is not recognized by any
connection to a formal proof. It stands alone.
The ability to stand alone as evidence is what links mathematical picture proofs
with thought experiments. To pursue this I now turn to Norton’s account.
7 Problems with Norton
Not all TEs lead to a conclusion. Some present us with a puzzle, not an answer.
For instance, in the the TE known as the Ship of Theseus we are asked to imagine
15For more examples of picture proofs and for a discussion of various aspects of them, see Brown
(1999/2008).
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a ship that over time has every part replaced, so that eventually nothing remains of
the original. We might further imagine the old parts recombined so as to form a
ship. Which of these two is the true ship of Theseus? This is the fundamental
metaphysical problem of identity. What makes a thing the thing that it is? The TE
is a mere curiosity when it comes to ships but highly significant when it comes to
people: What (if anything) makes a person the same person over time? No theory
of identity is either supported or undermined by the Ship of Theseus TE. The point
is to make the problem of identity manifest. Reconstructing the TE as an argument
is not possible; there is no argument because there is no conclusion.
Some TEs are illustrations of a theory. They play a pedagogical rather than an
evidential role. Newton’s cannon TE, for instance, produces that wonderful sense of
understanding how bodies such as the moon can stay in place by perpetually
falling. We imagine a cannon firing cannon balls farther and farther, eventually
circling the earth and returning to their starting point and, hence, repeating their
orbital motion indefinitely. (See Figure 4.) Newton already calculated the result
without a TE. He gave us the TE to help us understand. Again, an argument from
premisses to conclusion is beside the point. Helping us to “see” is everything.
Other TEs try to establish how something is possible. Critics of Darwin, for
instance, claim that so-called natural selection could not produce something like
the eye or the opposable thumb. Darwin and biologists since him have been at
pains to specify evolutionary pathways that would have these results. They are not
always claiming that this is what happened. They only claim that known early
conditions could be followed by a sequence of changes allowed by natural selection
that resulted in the complex human eye. There is no deductive or inductive
argument that begins with empirically justified premisses and concludes with the
formation of the eye. It is only showing that the possibility of such a result is
compatible with what we know. It is a “how possible,” not a “how actual”
demonstration. It is a refutation of the “not possible” claim.
I do not think cases such as these hurt Norton’s main point, at least not much.
They do, however, show that TEs, like real experiments, work in multiply different
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Figure 4: Newton’s TE on projectile motion.
ways. We can ignore these diverse examples and restrict our discussion of Norton
to TEs that play an evidential role of some sort in coming to a definite conclusion.
Not all TEs can be arguments, but perhaps the main ones in physics can be. It
would be a great achievement for Norton to account for the influential TEs of
Galileo, Newton, Einstein, and others in terms of arguments. These are the ones we
really care about.
Besides reconstructing specific examples of TEs as arguments, Norton offers
another consideration for his argument view.
Reliability thesis. If thought experiments can be used reliably
epistemically, then they must be arguments (construed very broadly)
that justify their outcomes or are reconstructible as such arguments.
(Norton 2004b, 52)
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Understood strictly, Norton’s point is that if a TE cannot be reconstructed as an
argument then its conclusion would need to be justified some other way, such as a
priori intuition. This is impossible on empiricist grounds. It is fair to say that the
thesis assumes TEs can indeed be used reliably as evidence, and it is done on
empiricist grounds. Moreover, TEs (most, if not all) can be used reliably,
independently from their reconstruction as an argument. This reliability,
independent from reconstruction, must be based on empirical grounds.
Let T be a specific TE and its reconstruction as an argument T ′. According to
Norton the thing to be evaluated ultimately is T ′. As mentioned above, this is done
by asking: Are the premisses true (or at least evidentially supported) and is the
derivation of the conclusion deductively or inductively valid? If yes to both of
these, then T ′ is a good TE.
However, to repeat, Norton rightly acknowledges that T can be reliably used in its
own right independent from the reconstructed argument T ′. “Thought experiments
are commonly taken to be more than just generators of interesting hypotheses.
Thought experimentation is also taken to be a reliable mode of inquiry.” (2004b,
52) In other words, TEs operate within the realm of justification, not discovery.
The reliability thesis is a welcome feature of Norton’s account, since it embraces
the obvious fact that normal TEs are in their own right taken to be evidence for
their conclusion. Scientists, philosophers, and anyone else reading a standard TE
will typically not need the reconstruction to be convinced.
Most TEs have not been reconstructed as arguments, just as most mathematical
proofs have not been reconstructed as formal proofs. The views of Norton and
Burgess turn out to be the same on this fundamental point. For both of them
justification is a two-stage process, with the second not playing much of a role. The
first stage typically convinces us by itself. But, according to Burgess and Norton,
the first stage also convinces us of the existence of the second stage, the formal
proof or the reconstructed argument. It is belief in the existence of a second stage
that is so crucial for them.
26
The problem is this: if the first stage is rightly convincing by itself, why bother
with the second, except, perhaps, in rare questionable cases? This is a problem for
Norton and for Burgess, alike. I have already discussed the problem as it arises in
Burgess. Now to the problem as it occurs in Norton.
Norton declares, “The reconstructions are generally rather straightforward and
often differ little from the original narrative of the thought experiment.” (Norton
2004b, 50). Recall that Burgess says a rigorous proof typically contains the key
steps in a formal proof. If Norton had made it a condition of a good TE that it
outlined the structure a fully specified argument, then we would have exactly the
same view. As it is, they come pretty close.
I will not attempt to provide a TE that cannot be reconstructed as an argument,
but maybe we can come close.16 According to Norton, a good (but not yet
reconstructed) TE is already an argument although only in rough form. Perhaps it
is missing a premiss that we could fill in without too much difficulty. This is why it
is both convincing and reliable. The relevant question is how close is the original
TE to the reconstruction?
Before producing a TE that might pose a problem, we should consider some simple
examples that strike us as non-arguments but nevertheless as plausible inferences. I
am not asserting that any one of these is true, only that they illustrate candidates
for an alternative to deductive/inductive inference as a way to extend out
knowledge.
Descartes’s cogito strikes many as a good inference that is in no way an argument,
either deductive or inductive. The proposition “I think, therefore I am” seems
16Permit me a biographical remark. From time to time I find a TE that I am confident cannot be
reconstructed along Norton lines. I send it to John, who has been a friendly rival for many years,
and gleefully wait for him to throw in the towel. Alas, within a day or two I am rebuffed with a
plausible reconstruction, often cleverly done. I have now given up the hope of ever finding a clear
counterexample. I am still not won over to his view, but I resist it for other kinds reasons. I am
only concerned here with that aspect of Norton’s account of TEs that is similar to Burgess’s view
of proofs. I leave other considerations aside. See Brendel (2017) for a survey of critical discussions
of various aspects of Norton’s view.
27
correct to us as soon as we understand it. But there is no rule of inference taking
us from the premiss to the conclusion.
Moore’s paradox is another example where we grasp the falsity of a proposition
without deductive or inductive rules playing a role. The paradoxical proposition is:
“P is true, but I do not believe P.” It is immediately recognized as somehow
self-contradictory even though “P is true” does not contradict “I do not believe p.”
(Note that “P is true but I did not believe P” is unproblematic. It is only the
present tense version that is paradoxical. We recognize a problem without any
empirical input and without appealing to any rule of inference, deductive or
inductive.
Colour exclusions are another candidate. “If X is red all over, then X is not blue all
over.” Neither deductive nor inductive logic will get us from the antecedent to the
consequent. Nor is it an analytic truth, since the concept of not blue is not
contained in the concept red. And yet it seems incontestably true.
These examples are controversial, but, to repeat, that is of little concern to us. I
cite them only as possible candidates; they show the possibility of inferences that
are not justified by logic. Thought experimental reasoning is sometimes more like
these than like a deductive or inductive argument. They are examples of intuitions,
a nonsensory form of cognition. Now to some TEs.
Galileo’s TE on falling bodies can be reconstructed as an argument. The first part
fits Norton’s argument view very well; it is a reductio ad absurdum of Aristotle’s
account. The second part, however, involves some sort of insight and is not
obviously an argument, but more like a direct perception. Of course, it could be
both, an intuition and reconstructable as an argument.
Stevin’s double inclined plane TE is also reconstructable as an argument, but in
considering it, we come to have an epiphany. The background knowledge of the
impossibility of perpetual motion machines and the intuition about symmetry do
the trick. See Figure 5, top. Which way would the chain move on the frictionless
double inclined plane? It is steeper on the right, but there is more weight on the
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left. By adding the weights underneath, we easily solve the problem. The
additional weights will pull each side symmetrically. If the whole starts to move
(or, if it speeds up when already moving), then we would have the makings of a
perpetual motion machine from which we could draw endless energy, which is
impossible.
Figure 5: Stevin’s double inclined plane TE.
Herman Weyl was a big fan of symmetry and had no qualms about a priori
physics, which he saw as linked. “As far as I see all a priori statements in physics
have their origin in symmetry.” (Weyl 1952, 126)
Norton can reconstruct TEs as arguments with the same conclusion as Galileo or
Stevin. However, I claim, the link between the initial TE and the argument
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reconstruction is weak; it is not a mere filling in of missing but obvious premisses.
Both of these TEs are correct; no one disputes them. And I will not dispute
Norton’s ability to provide a sound argument reconstruction for each. However,
they also strike most people as obvious at first reading. This is the crucial point.
No reconstruction is needed to appreciate their veracity. The reconstruction
contributes nothing, just as the Burgess’s formal proof contributes nothing to the
evidence.
8 Concluding Remarks
Time to take stock. Burgess and Norton have put forward plausible, detailed
accounts of mathematical rigour and thought experiments, respectively. In one
important respect they are identical. Burgess justifies the standard evidence we
find in mathematics, explaining that it is indeed rigorous because it convinces
mathematicians of the existence of a formal proof, the gold standard. Moreover,
the ordinary proof typically contains the key steps of the formal proof. This has
the virtue of minimizing the epistemic gap between them. Norton similarly claims
that any TE can be reconstructed as an argument. Moreover, he too, claims that
typically we can easily recognize the argument structure of the initial TE, making
the epistemic gap small, as well.
Against Burgess I presented examples, especially picture proofs, that would seem to
be genuine trustworthy proofs that do not correspond to formal proofs. And
against Norton I presented examples where the reconstruction would seem to be
irrelevant, since the initial TEs are utterly convincing in their own right.
One particularly interesting feature of these two accounts is that they do not play
on the traditional discovery-justification distinct. Whatever might go into the
discovery of a proof or TE in the first place, is of no concern to the two-stage
justification process. Burgess proofs and Norton TEs are already in the realm of
justification. We might even call it early and late justification, corresponding to the
initial proof or TE and then to the formal proof or reconstructed argument. What
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I hope to have shown is that this way of looking at things is a mistake, at least if it
is taken to be universal. The early stage is complete evidence for a theorem or a
TE as it stands.
New questions arises: What is it about the initial proof or the initial TE that
accounts for the recognition of its sufficiency as evidence? Burgess wants rigorous
proofs to build on what went before. But how reliable is that? It could be genuine
objective knowledge or it could be arbitrary stipulations. The examples and the
history of mathematics suggest something closer to the former, while theorems
about chess are, of course, more like the latter. I won’t argue for it here, but I
remain convinced of a broadly platonistic outlook, and think it intact after
considering Burgess’s account of rigour. I am inclined to say something similar in
light of Norton’s account of TEs. We seem to have some cognitive ability that
allows us to grasp truths in the abstract realm, which is the source of our
knowledge. I have argued for this elsewhere and will not repeat the case for it
here.17 The initial proof or TE guides our intuitions (at least in some cases) of the
abstract realm, which is why the proof or TE not only seems right but reliably is
right.
The case against Burgess and Norton is not merely a refutation of their views, but
also opens new possibilities for evidence. Mathematical proofs need not be tied to
formal proofs, and TEs need not be tied to derivations from empirically justified
premisses. New ways of learning are possible.
Let me end with a profession of hope. I think the Burgess account of mathematical
rigour is plausible and probably right for most cases — but not for everything. And
I think the Norton account of TEs is also right for many cases — but is not the
whole story. The abstract realm, the home of proofs and TEs, is so rich and varied
in its content that there is very likely not a single kind of evidence. A pluralistic
outlook seems best. Wittgenstein remarked that mathematics is a “motley of
techniques of proof.” (Wittgenstein 1956/78 46). He meant it somewhat
17See Brown (1991/2011 and 1999/2008.)
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disparagingly — I do not. The same could be said about TEs. Yes, proofs are
evidence, but so are diagrams, and intuitions, and statistical arguments, and much
more. And they not only yield truths, but sometimes also explanations and
understanding. (To be fair to both Burgess and Norton, explanation and insight
are not intended to be part of their concerns.) We accept things because of the
available evidence for them. But there is no reason to confine ourselves to formal
proofs or to empirical observations and deductive or inductive logic as the only
legitimate forms of evidence. Rational belief runs well beyond what these can
justify by either Burgess or Norton means. In mathematics and in thought
experiments — and everywhere else — we should be guided by these fundamental
epistemic principles: (1) We have many cognitive capacities, including (fallible)
intuition. (2) Truth and understanding are achievable, although certainty is not.
(3) We are always in the middle working out in all directions, often using newly
invented means as we go.
What do we want? Truth and explanation and understanding. We often get it with
TEs; the initial version is usually sufficient. Reconstruction and rigour can’t deliver
much. They can give us truth and certainty only if we start with truth and
certainty. How likely is that, given empirical fallibility or that mathematical axioms
are fallibly self-evident or outright conjectures? Reconstruction and rigour do not
even try for explanation and understanding. At best, they maintain them, if they
are in the initial proof or TE. The problem with making much of rigour is that it
leaves out a great deal of mathematical activity. Huge advances are made with
definitions. Think of Dedekind’s definition of real numbers. All sorts of important
things rigorously follow from it; modern analysis largely rests on it. But no one has
ever proved that it is correct. Instead, we see it as a brilliant solution to a problem
of dealing with irrational numbers and we embraced it for that reason. It is outside
the realm of rigour. But it is inside the realm of explanation and understanding. Is
it certain? No, but we can reasonably hope it is true.
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